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MICHAEL G. COLLINS*

The Salvage of Sunken
Military Vessels
In 1968 a diesel-powered Soviet submarine left the Russian port of Vladivostok on a routine mission. Shortly thereafter, the Golf-class (G-class),
submarine, armed with three nuclear-tipped missiles, surfaced in the northwest Pacific Ocean. An explosion occurred, apparently caused by a spark which
ignited gasses trapped in the hull of the vessel.' The submarine immediately
sank to a depth of 17,000 feet at a location approximately 750 miles from the
Hawaiian Islands.
A Soviet task force searched unsuccessfully for the submarine for two months
although the United States Navy had known the approximate location of the
wreckage soon after the explosion occurred. Submarine monitors of the United
States had recorded the accident and placed the wreckage within a radius of ten
square miles. Following the departure of the Russian fleet the United States
Navy employed its research ship Mizar to pinpoint the site of the wreckage. The
Mizar located the Soviet wreck four months after the accident and successfully
photographed the sunken submarine.'
The events of the next six years constituted an undercover operation of
incredible magnitude which was later called "a fanciful blend of James Bond
and Jules Verne." ' The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
realized the submarine was a potential intelligence windfall because the Soviet
warship was believed to contain highly sophisticated coding and decoding

*Law Clerk for Crobarger & Tessem, San Diego, CA; JD. Candidate, May 1977, California
Western School of Law.
'In 1968 it was estimated that the Soviets employed nearly 100 submarines, 60 of which were
believed to have been diesel-powered. The Golf-class, or "G" vessel, carries from two to eight
nuclear-tipped missiles of the Serb variety, which have a 650 mile range and a 500 Kiloton warhead.
Petrowski, Military Use of the Ocean Space and the Continental Shelf 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
279 (1968).
'The Great Submarine Snatch. TimE, March 31, 1975 at 20.
'Id.; see also Alpern, CIA's Mission Impossible, NEwsWEEX, March 31, 1975 at 24.
4
TIME, supra note 2, at 20.
'Alpern, supra note 3, at 24.
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devices in addition to the arsenal of nuclear missiles. 6 Hence, in 1970 the CIA
conceived a plan to salvage the submarine without the Soviets' knowledge. The
CIA initiated "Project Jennifer" with White House approva 7 and commissioned
the design and construction of a special ship, the Glomar Explorer, for the
purpose of salvaging the Soviet submarine and its invaluable cargo.
During the period of construction and testing it was publicized that the
Glomar was designed to mine valuable manganese nodules which strew the
ocean floor. 8 It was under this guise that the Glomar sailed to the vicinity of the
sunken ship. During July and August of 1974, the "mining" ship successfully
salvaged one-third of the wreckage. 9 The other two-thirds of the submarine
apparently slipped from the grasp of the Glomar's machinery and dropped to
the ocean floor. These portions were never recovered because the Glomar was
forced to return to Hawaii in late summer when the seas grew too choppy for
further salvage efforts. It was reported that, during the Glomar's return voyage,
intelligence experts thoroughly examined the Soviet wreckage and, upon
completion of the analysis, they cut the hull into small pieces which were then
dumped into the sea.' 0
When the Glomar adventure was publicized in the United States, in late
March, 1975, 11 the CIA was embroiled in domestic controversy;' 2 consequently,
Americans considered Project Jennifer as "just a part of the CIA saga."' 3 Public
'TIME,

7

supra note 2, at 20.

U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, March 31, 1975 at 16.

'For a discussion of deep-sea mining and manganese nodules, see The Oceans, TME July 29,
1974 at 54. Briefly, manganese nodules are chunks of material that litter the ocean floor and contain
manganese (essential for the manufacture of steel), nickel, cobalt, and copper. It is theorized that
these minerals are dissolved in rainwater, carried off land masses by streams and rivers and
deposited in the ocean. When the mineral particles settle to the bottom they collect on solid objects,
forming the "nodules." It is estimated that the Pacific is littered with nearly 1.5 trillion tons of these
nodules, valued at $200 a ton.
This article was the first to publicize in any detail the circumstances surrounding the design and
construction of the GlomarExplorer. It reported that the Glomar was being tested off the coast of
Hawaii. Ironically, it was at this time that the Glomar was actually involved in salvaging the
submarine.
'Reports varied about the Glomar's success. An official accounting was never given of the salvage
inventory, however, the consensus was that a full one-third of the submarine was salvaged for the
CIA. See, e.g., L.A. Times, March 20, 1975, § 1, at 18, col. 2; New York Times, March 19, 1975, at

52, col. 8;

NEWSEEK,

March 31, 1975 at 24;

TIME,

March 31, 1975 at 25.

"oWashington Post, March 19, 1975, § A, at 14, col. 5.
"Project Jennifer was first reported on March 19, 1975. See, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1975 at 1,
col. 8; L.A. Times, March 19, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 5; Chicago Tribune, March 19, 1975, § 1, at 1, col.
5; Wash. Post, § A, at 1,col. 2.
"Before and during the media exposure of Project Jennifer, the CIA was under investigation by
various domestic committees. The committees sought to examine reports that the CIA was involved
in political assassinations of foreign officials, unauthorized investigations of domestic figures and
harrassment of ideological leaders of factional groups within the United States. See, e.g.,
N.Cousins, Cloaks andDaggersand the U.S. Constitution, SAT. REV., Feb. 8, 1975 at 2; Langguth,
Abolish the CIA, NEWSWEEi,, April 7, 1975 at 11; Problems of the CIA, NATION, March 15, 1975 at
290.
"U.S. NEwS AND WORLD REPORT, March 31, 1975 at 16.
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outrage focused upon the project's expense in relation to its worth and its effects
on detente were questioned. 4
Soviet reaction to the salvage operation was unusually calm. The U.S.S.R.
ambassador in Washington cabled Moscow and advised the Soviet government
to make a firm protest" but Russian officials and the Soviet press remained
silent. Most observers had predicted this reaction because a more profound
position only would have advertised the embarrassing situation of the U.S.S.R.
government. 17 The Soviet Union did not possess the technological capabilities to
salvage its submarine and the 1968 sinking had never been reported by the
Soviet media.
The Glomar incident appears to be the first time a country has ever attempted
to salvage a foreign military vessel sunk in international waters.'" The
international implications of Project Jennifer have been largely ignored because
of Russia's lack of protest and the United States' preoccupation with the
improprieties of the CIA. A recurrence is likely because the propriety of the
salvage operation remains unquestioned. The Soviet Union and the United
States have lost other warships in international waters' 9 which could be salvaged
by a country with sophisticated equipment like the Glomar. Undoubtedly
foreign intelligence agencies would be as pleased to examine the wreckage of
these ships as the CIA was with the Soviet wreckage; moreover, it appears that

4
See, e.g., Alpern, CIA's Mission Impossible, NEWSWEEK, March 31, 1975 at 32; Trying to
"Swipe" a Russian Sub Is Just a Partof the CIA Saga, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, March 31,
1975 at 17.
"The strongest protest concerned the disposition of the bodies of ten Soviet crewmen, who were
allegedly raised with the submarine. The Russians condemned the CIA for burying the bodies at sea
and the CIA had expected that this action would raise the greatest outcry. One agent said, "Believe
me, this was one of our greatest fears. We took some real precautions on this one."
The CIA made plans for a proper burial at sea, as they expected the Glomar would raise some
corpses. The salvage ship was equipped with refrigerators to store the bodies. When the burial took
place, the service was conducted in strict accordance with the Soviet naval manual. The ceremony
was read in both Russian and English and filmed in color and with sound. Washington Post, March
20, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 8; Russians Angered Over Sea Burialby the CIA, N. Y. Times, April 25,
1975 at 32, col. 2.
"TIME, March 31, 1975 at 25.
"Id. at 26; NEWSWEEK, March 31, 1975 at 32; Washington Post, March 23, 1975, § B, at 6,
col. 1.
"Or so the present author believes, because an exhaustive search of salvage records has failed to
disclose any such report.
"On May 21, 1968, the United States Scorpion, a nuclear-powered submarine with 90 men
aboard, sank in more than 10,000 feet of water, about 400 miles southeast of the island Sao Miguel
in the Azores. Five months later, the Mizar, the same ship that found the Russian vessel, photographed the hull of the Scorpion lying on the bottom of the ocean. Enough of the wreck remains
which could tempt industrious salvors. Moreover, the U.S.S. Thresher was lost off Cape Cod in
1963, only a few scraps being found of that submarine. NEWSWEEK, November 18, 1968, at 104.
A Soviet nuclear submarine of the "November" class sank on the high seas, 550 miles southeast of
Lands End, England. It now appears that it too could be located and salvaged. N.Y. Times, April
16, 1970, at 14, col. 3-6.
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any nation could salvage whatever munitions or government materials a foreign
country may dump at sea. 20
Any attempt by one nation to salvage valued property belonging to a foreign
government could threaten world peace and order. Numerous writers21
questioned whether the Soviet Union would have been legally justified in sinking
the Glomar Explorer had its true mission been discovered. Since these writers
have left the question unanswered, evidently there is either a lack of
international salvage regulations or existing laws are incapable of dealing with
an incident that may arise from a salvage in international waters.
This Comment will examine Project Jennifer in light of current international
theories of salvage and explore the statutes and salvage policies of the United
States and the Soviet Union. 2 Those laws and agreements unequivocally allow
any country to salvage sunken private vessels but it will become apparent that
there are virtually no provisions which control the salvage of sunken military
vessels from international waters. 3 Accordingly, the focal point of this Comment is a proposal that the international community adopt regulations to
govern the salvage of military ships sunk outside the territorial jurisdiction of
any nation.
The central thesis, the infirmities of international salvage laws, will be
highlighted by a discussion of the primary issues raised by Project Jennifer: (1)
whether the Russian submarine had been abandoned and, therefore, legally
vulnerable to salvors; (2) whether the United States was required to inform the
Soviet Union of the intended operation and its success; and (3) whether the
Soviet Union could have legally stopped or prevented Project Jennifer.
I. General Concepts of Salvage
The laws of salvage have evolved from Roman law doctrine which awarded
compensation from the owner to those who voluntarily preserved, protected or
improved another's property.2" Two early decisions by the United States
Supreme Court, The Blackwal2 s and The Sabine, 26 reflect these ancient Roman
principles. Salvage was defined as:
0
"A prime target would be the site in the Atlantic Ocean, 283 miles east of Cape Kennedy,
Florida, where the United States has dumped munitions for many years. In 1970 the United States
Army sank a boat laden with 410 concrete "coffins" of lethal nerve gas at this site. The cargo
remains there beneath 16,000 feet of water. N.Y. Times, August 18, 1970, at 7, col. 1.
"See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, March 20, 1975, § 1, at 15, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 19, 1975, at
52, col. 8; L.A. Times, March 20, 1975, § 1, at 14, col. 1.
22
Reference to CIA activity is included, not for condemnation but because it launched the
multitude of potential problems that will be discussed herein.
"See Russian Sub Poses Question of Ownership, Chicago Tribune, March 20, 1975, § 1, at 1, col.
1.: "Maritime experts told the Tribune they could find no regulation in international law governing
the salvage procedure of a warship in international waters during peacetime."
"Norris, Misconduct of Salvors, 18 BROOKLYN L. REV. 247 (1952).
"The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869).

"The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 (1879).
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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...the compensation allowed to persons by whose assistance a ship or her cargo has
been saved, in whole or in part, from impending peril on the sea, or in recovering such
property from actual loss; as in cases of shipwreck, derelict or recapture."
This definition implies that the term "salvage" embodies two distinct
elements: the act of salvage itself and the reward for that act. In essence, these
components are entirely different, and the law of salvage may best be
understood by a separate treatment of each.
The act of salvage is one of assistance; it is a voluntary service rendered to a
vessel or cargo that is exposed to immediate or impending peril of loss or
damage at sea or on any navigable body of water. 28 "Useful services of any
kind"" may qualify as acts of salvage.
Reward for the performance of such acts is made in recognition of
meritorious service and to encourage these services 30 rather than as payment on
32
the principle of quantum meruit3 or pro opere et labore. Public policy
allocates compensation "in the interests of commerce and as an encouragement
33
to prompt voluntary service to minimize personal and economic loss." Reward
is also given to deter such crimes as fraud and embezzlement in the course of a
salvage because surveillance by the law is often impracticable on the seas.

Compensation for salvage thereby "presupposes

good faith, meritorious

services, complete restoration, and incorruptible vigilance, so far as the
property is within the reach or under the control of the salvors." 34
A successful salvor is given a lien3" as reward for his services, 36 enabling him
"The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 12 (1869); The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 (1879).
"The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 12 (1869).
29Id.
' 0Nearly all treatises and articles pertaining to salvage refer to the following quote from The
Blackwall when discussing the element of reward:
Compensation as salvage is not viewed by the admiralty courts merely as pay, on the principle
of quantum meruit, or as a remuneration pro opere et labore, but as a reward given for perilous
services, voluntarily rendered and as an inducement to seamen and to others to embark in such
undertakings to save life and property.
The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869).
3
"As much as he deserved." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1408 (4th ed. 1968).
""For work and labor." Id. at 1364.
"The Mist Chief 57 F.2d 875, 877 (D. R.I. 1931); see also NoRRis, THE LAW OF SALVAGE, 2-4
(1958).
34
The Island City, 66 U.S. 121, 130 (1861).
"The salvage lien is a property right in the rescued property; the property is given as security for
the debt or claim of the salvor. The lien is a "privileged claim upon a thing in respect of service done
to it or injury by it, to be carried into effect by legal process." NoRRls, THE LAW OF SALVAGE 231
(1958).
The theory behind the lien is not based upon the idea that the owner is indebted to the volunteer
for his services:
While the interest of a salvor is salved property is called a lien, it is not based, in the absence of
an express contract, upon the idea of a debt due by the owner to the salvor for services
rendered; rather it is founded upon the principle that the service creates a property in the thing
saved.
47 Salvage, AM. JUR. § 30 (1943).
"The lien is awarded to only those who act under no legal obligation and only if their actions are
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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to maintain an in rem action against the salvaged property in a court of
admiralty. 3 The court determines what compensation is reasonable for the
services rendered; the determination of reasonable compensation is based on
the following considerations: (1) the labor expended by the salvors; (2) the
promptitude, skill and energy shown by the salvors; (3) the value of the property
used by the salvors in rendering the service, and the amount of danger the
property was exposed to; (4) the risks encountered by the salvors in their work;
(5) the value of the salvaged goods; and (6) the degree of peril from which the
property was rescued.3"
When determining what compensation is due a salvor, the court also
considers whether or not the salvor committed any crime during the salvage
effort. Fraud or embezzlement, however small, subjects a salvor to diminution
or forfeiture of reward. 3 9
A salvor saves endangered property for the benefit of the owner with the
expectation of compensation. Rights of ownership in distressed vessels or cargo
are unimpaired by a salvage operation and the salvor is entitled only to a lien to
protect his interests. 40 Title to property is not lost by sinking, unless perhaps the
41
vessel or cargo is deemed abandoned. '
Generally, abandonment consists of two elements: external action and (the
controlling element) an intention to abandon. 41 In maritime law, the act of

successful to some degree. Reward does not depend upon total success, but it may be granted when
only a portion of the property is saved from destruction. See GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY, 534-6 (1975).
"For a brief description of the procedure followed to pursue one's claim, see Norris, Misconduct
of Salvors, 18 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 247, 260 (1952).
Generally, after a libel has been brought against the property, the cargo or vessel is arrested at the
port to which it was brought. Customarily, the owners of the goods then post security to release the
property from custody. The amount of the bond is limited to a reasonable estimation of the value of
the salvage service. After these procedures have been followed the issue is brought to the admiralty
court for a final determination of the compensation to be paid the salvor.
3
The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869).
"'The Island City, 66 U.S. 121 (1861); United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132 (No. 16, 317)
(C.C. N.D. Cal. 1864); The Boston, 3 F. Cas. 932, 936 (No. 1,673) (C.C.D. Mass. 1883):
Amazingly, it will be found, I believe, in the maritime jurisprudence of the whole world, that
embezzlement by salvors, directly or by connivance, is punished by a forfeiture of all claim to
salvage.
Forfeiture or diminution of the reward is also levied if the salvor exaggerated the value of his
services or the dangers involved; if he unnecessarily prolonged the salvage; or if the salvor's actions
necessitated the operation. Norris, Misconduct of Salvors, 18 BROOKLYN L. REV. 247, 250-1 (1952).
40... under the general maritime law, title to any vessel or its contents is not lost as a result of
wrecking or sinking. All rights of ownership in such property remain unimpaired until it has
been abandoned by the owners. Anyone performing salvage would acquire only a lien against
the property salved.
Letter to author from T.E. Lohrey, Jr., Admiralty Counsel, Department of the Navy, Office of the
Judge Advocate General. (Copy on file at CALIFORNIA W. INT'L L.J.)
"I1d.

"4The No. 105, 97 F.2d 425, 426 (5th Cir. 1938). See also Rights in and Ownership of wrecked or
derelict vessels and their contents not cast upon the shore, 63 A.L.R. 2d 1369, 1373 (1959).
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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abandonment is evidenced by voluntary relinquishment of title by the owner of
the distressed property. 43 It must be shown that the owner intended to terminate
ownership rights by his action;4 4 however, abandonment does not vest title in
the goods in any other person.41
Abandoned property may be salvaged by anyone," but should the salvage be
47
successful, the titleholder must be determined by a court of admiralty.
Numerous propositions have been advanced concerning ownership of
abandoned chattels4 I and since each is at variance with the other, the salvor is
often unsure of his interests in the salvaged goods. This has led one expert to
state:
I believe that there is no branch of salvage law so little understood and free from
misconception to proctors and laymen alike, as the question
pertaining to ownership
49
of distressed, abandoned, or wrecked property at sea.
These general maritime theories of salvage have been codified by the United
States and the U.S.S.R. and formulated into an international agreement. The
propriety of the salvage operation performed by the Glomar Explorer will be
clarified by discussing Project Jennifer in relation to these laws. An analysis of
the situation must rely on international law because Project Jennifer was
conducted on the high seas-that part of the sea not included in the territorial
or internal waters of a state.S0 International law governs this salvage under the
principle recognized in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas," that
"no State may validly purport to subject any part of [the high seas] to its
sovereignty." 2
II. International Salvage Law
The maxim of the salvage laws is that the best interests of the world
community are served by compensating those who save or protect property
'The Port Hunter, 6 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.C.D. Mass. 1934).
44Id.
4

SThe No. 105., 97 F.2d 425, 426 (5th Cir. 1938).
(1958).
'See NORRS, THE LAW OF SALVAGE, 247 (1958):
When property has been sunk at sea . . . the owner

4'NoRRIs, THE LAW OF SALVAGE, 61

has not been divested of title by virtue of
that fact. And neither does the salvor given title by finding it. It is his obligation to bring the
salvaged property before an admiralty court ... where the owner will be given an opportunity
to come in and claim the property.
"For a discussion of the numerous theories advanced regarding ownership of abandoned property, see Lohrey, Sunken Vessels, Their Cargoes, and the CasualSalvor, 20 JAG J. 25 (1965). See
also Kenny, The Ownership of the Treasures of the Sea. 9 W. & M. L. REv. 383 (1967).
"NoRRIs, supra note 47 at 257.
"The Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (1958), art. 1,
defined the high seas as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State."
"Id.
"Id. art. 2.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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imperiled on navigable waters. 3 Thus, the principles of salvage are a part of the
law of nations (the jus gentium). ' Questions and conflicts arising from salvage
operations on the high seas should, therefore, be resolved by reference to thejus
gentium rather than to the municipal and domestic laws of the countries in
dispute.s
Only one international agreement specifically addresses the subject of
salvage.5 6 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea 7 codified many of the principles of
salvage which had guided maritime nations for hundreds of years. It is stated
that:
S.. it is readily apparent from a perusal of the treaty and its negotiating history that
the primary reason for its conclusion was to serve a humanitarian purpose, and
secondly to afford additional safety to property endangered...ss
The issues raised by Project Jennifer should be examined in light of this
Convention because the Soviet Union and the United States have adhered to the
agreement since becoming signatories.5 9 Two fundamental questions are: was
the salvage by the United States permitted by the agreement, and if the Soviet
wreckage was abandoned, did that entitle the United States to possession of the
salvaged craft?
Article I of the Convention provides that "sea-going vessels and vessels of
inland navigation" are subject to the terms of the agreement. 60 These vessels are
proper subjects of salvage and persons who aid them are entitled to
remuneration for their services. 6 1 Although it would appear that the sea-going
Soviet submarine was vulnerable to salvage, Article 14 of the Convention
specifically exempts "ships of war or Government ships appropriated

"See the decision rendered by Judge Story in The Henry Ewbank, 11 F. Cas. 1166, 1170 (No.
6376) (C.C.D. Mass. 1833):
Salvage... is not a question of compensation pro opere et labore. It arises to a higher dignity.
It takes its source in a deeper policy. It combines with private merit and individual sacrifices
large considerations of the public good, of commercial liberality, and of international justice.
It offers a premium, by way of honorary reward, for prompt and ready assistance to human
sufferings: ...
"GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 533 (1975); NORRIS, supra note 47 at 22.
"The Bee, 3 F. Cas. 4143 (No. 1,219) (D.C.D. Ma. 1836); Usatorre v. Compania Argentina
Navegacion Mihanovich Ltd., 172 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1949).
"The Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules Respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea,
signed at Brussels, Sept. 23, 1910. 37 Stat. 1658 (1912). Among its signatories are the United
States, the Soviet Union and nearly eighty other countries and protectorates.
"Hereinafter cited as the Convention.
"9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (1968).
"The Convention, supra note 59. United States ratification, Feb. 1, 1913, 37 Stat. 1658; Soviet
Union ratification, Law of Feb. 2, 1926, 31 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R. Item 188 (Supreme Soviet
U.S.S.R.).
'°ld. art. 1.
'Id. art. 2: "Every act of assistance or salvage which has had a useful result gives a right to
equitable remuneration."
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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exclusively to a public service" from the provisions of the agreement. 62
Article 14 implies the following: (1) the Soviet Golf-class submarine is not
affected by the Convention; and (2) the GlomarExplorer, a ship "appropriated
exclusively to a public service," is likewise exempted from the Convention's
principles. Thus, Article 14 does not solve the question whether the United
States properly salvaged the Soviet wreck. It might be presumed that because
the Russian vessel is not governed by the Convention it is beyond the reach of
salvors; 63 but it may also be argued that the salvage was not barred by the
Convention or subject to its scrutiny because the Glomar is also exempted.
The immunities offered by the Convention, in effect, set off one claim against
the other. The position of the Soviet Union may be that the Convention states
that only the ships provided for in Article I are proper subjects of salvage.
Accordingly, a nation should not be permitted to subject a sunken warship to
salvage. The contrary contention is that a government ship should be allowed to
assist or salvage any vessel at sea, regardless of the character of ownership. The
United States could contend that because the Glomar did not fall within the
Convention its salvage of the Soviet submarine was therefore proper and the
United States was thereby entitled to compensation or ownership of the vessel.
An interpretation of Article 14 which is germane to the immunity issue was
proffered by a United States court in The Impoco. 64 It was stated in that case
that Article 14 does not prevent the United States from recovering salvage
compensation for services rendered by its ships. The United States could
contend that that decision supports the legality of Project Jennifer; however,
there was no argument made in that case in support of the position that the
salvage gave the United States title to the Soviet wreckage. The Convention is
also non-supportive of the United States claim of ownership because it does not
address the problem.
It is surprising that a provision for the settlement of property disputes such as
abandonment and title is noticeably lacking in the Convention. As previously
stated, the primary concern of the compact was to protect endangered property
and to promote humanitarianism. The absence of such a provision seems to
reflect a belief that these disputes would be best settled according to the
domestic laws of the countries involved. It is therefore stated that salvage claims
against public vessels must be heard before local courts and adjudicated under
domestic law. 6
It is clear that the Convention does not offer suitable solutions to the

"Id. art. 14.
3
Article 1 and Article 14 provide that only seagoing vessels and vessels of inland navigation may
be salvaged in international waters. The suggestion is that public ships in international jurisdiction
are not to be salvaged.
"The Impoco, 287 F. 400, 402-405 (S.D. N.Y. 1922).
"Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1965).
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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quesitons under examination. The answers must be sought by scrutinizing the
general salvage precepts and policies formulated into the admiralty law and
66
traditions of the Soviet Union and the United States.
III. Salvage Concepts of the U.S.S.R.
The Soviet Union ratified the Convention in 192667 and incorporated its
provisions into Soviet maritime law by the 1929 Merchant Shipping Code of the
U.S.S.R. 6' Although the 1929 Code has been superseded, the principles of the
Convention are still reflected in the 1968 Merchant Shipping Code of the
U.S.S.R. 9
Articles 260-272 of Chapter XV of the 1968 Code detail the general provisions
of the Convention.70 Article 260 applies the rules of the Convention to the
salvage of any vessel "irrespective of the waters in which the salvage took place"
but broadens the Convention by applying the salvage laws to military ships. 7 A
literal interpretation of Article 260 would appear to authorize any country to
salvage a Russian military ship in international waters, whether afloat or sunk.
Under the 1968 Code, the salvage activity of the Glomar appears to be above
reproach.
It is questionable whether the Soviet Union would support this interpretation
of Article 260 because the Soviets distinguish sunken vessels from those still
afloat in need of assistance. Chapter VI of the Code, entitled "Sunken
Property," specifically addresses this point." Although Article 260 appears to
allow anyone to salvage Soviet vessels wherever located, Article 102 of Chapter
VI expressly prohibits anyone but agents of the U.S.S.R. Defense ministry to
salvage sunken Soviet military property."
Article 102 of the 1968 Code applies only to military property sunk within the
territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R.,74 but its terms suggest that if the Soviet

"In a monumental decision, The PaquetteHabana, The Lola, it was stated that:
...where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive and legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations;...
The PaquetteHabana, The Lola, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900).
"The Convention, supra note 56.
SLaw of June 14, 1929, Merchant Shipping Code of the U.S.S.R., 41 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R.
Item 366 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R-).
"Law of Sept. 17, 1968, Merchant Shipping Code of the U.S.S.R., 39 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S. R.
Item 351 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.).
101d. arts. 260-272.
"Id. art. 260: "The rules of the present chapter also shall apply to vessels sailing under a naval
flag of the U.S.S.R."
"Id. ch. VI. The basic purpose of Chapter VI of the Code is to provide for administration of
salvage operations by Soviet port authorities.
11Id. art. 102: "The raising of sunken military property shall be carried out by agencies of the
Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R."
"Id. art. 97.
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Union anticipated the possibility of a salvage operation on the high seas of
sunken property, then Article 260 would have been worded to prohibit an
operation like Project Jennifer.75 Nevertheless, it may safely be assumed that the
general maritime policy of the U.S.S.R. prohibits anyone but the Ministry of
Defense or its agents from salvaging sunken vessels of the U.S.S.R. navy. 76
Abandoned property may be salvaged by anyone 77 but it is unlikely that the
Soviet submarine was abandoned and thus free from salvage restrictions. The
1968 Code provides that a Soviet vessel will be considered abandoned only if the
terms of Article 21 are observed.78 Article 21 states:
Alienation to a foreign state, foreign organization or foreign citizen of a vessel in the
ownership of the Soviet State ...

shall be allowed only with the permission of the

79
Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Since Project Jennifer was entirely covert, it is obvious that the United States
was never given permission by the Council of Ministers to salvage the Soviet
submarine. Furthermore, there was no evidence of an intent on the part of the
Soviet Union to terminate ownership of the vessel. 8"
It is not clear whether the Soviet Union might have stopped or prevented
Project Jennifer had it known what the Glomar was attempting. The Soviet
Union is a party to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas8 which grants
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state to
a state-owned or -operated vessel. 82 The Geneva Convention would apparently
bar the Soviet Union from interfering with a vessel like the GlomarExplorer.

"It must be remembered that Article 102 is applicable insofar as it applies to property sunk
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Soviet Union. Under general principles of international law,
Article 260 would also be applicable only within the territorial jurisdiction of the Soviet Union.
However, Article 260 is the embodiment of an international agreement (The Convention, Article 14)
and would appear to have a more universal application.
Inasmuch as Project Jennifer was an international incident, Article 260 might conceivably apply
to the salvage. However, the Soviet Union would be powerless to object to the salvage of their
submarine, notwithstanding Article 102.
"This policy is especially true as it applies to foreign nations and citizens. An expert of Soviet
merchant shipping law aptly stated that:
Although Soviet legislation does not expressly restrict the performance of salving operations in
territorial waters to Soviet nationals, foreign vessels and citizens are nonetheless said to be
barred from such activity on the basis of "general principles."
W. BUTLER, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 83 (1971).
I"Supra note 46.
181968 Merchant Shipping Code of the U.S.S.R., supra note 69, art. 226.
"Id. art. 21.
"°See note 40, supra.
"Law of Oct. 1, 1962, Convention on the High Seas, 46 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R. Item 467
(Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.).
"The Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 50, art. 9:
Ships owned or operated by a state and used only on government noncommercial service shall,
on the high seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag
state.
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The absolute rule of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas is that public
vessels in international territory are not to be stopped, detained, seized,
attacked, or in any way subjected to aggressive action by a foreign ship.83 Yet,
international law does provide certain exceptions to this canon. A foreign vessel
may ignore the general law in instances of hot pursuit, piracy, slave trade, and
self-defense on the high seas. 8 4 Based upon an unusual interpretation of these
concepts, the Soviet Union might have attempted to interfere with Project
Jennifer by labelling it an act of piracy, despite absence of the essential motive
of private gain.
Piracy is traditionally defined as an act against a vessel, or property. of a
vessel, committed for private ends.85 Piracy is an international crime and any
state may seize the offending ship on the high seas, arrest the pirates, and
confiscate the property. 6 The Soviet Union's definition of piracy is much
broader than the traditional definition incorporated in the High Seas
Convention. 8 7 Soviet doctrine defines the crime as an "unlawful act of coercion
committed by a vessel or aircraft with respect to other vessels, persons and
property on the high seas. .. ." Under this interpretation piracy is not limited
to acts committed for private ends. Thus, state-owned ships would be subject to
detention and seizure or attack by the Soviet Union for an act of piracy;' 9
however, a Soviet jurist suggests that an act of a state-owned vessel would have
to be quite extraordinary to be classified as piracy because a violation of a public
ship's immunity has serious repurcussions. 90
Historically, the Soviet Union has classified the following acts as "piracy":
the sinking of the Lusitania; German and Italian acts on neutral vessels during
the Spanish Civil War; German submarine attacks on neutral merchant vessels
during World War II; and the detention of 178 Russian merchant ships by
Japan from 1941 to 1947.91
That the salvage operation in 1974 by the United States could be added to
this list of criminal acts is not a far-reaching assumption, given the peculiar
interpretation of piracy by the U.S.S.R. So classified, the Soviet Union might
well have sought to justify the taking of drastic measures to terminate Project
Jennifer. Although the Soviet Union might regard Project Jennifer as piracy

supra note 76 at 178.
"Id. at 178-185.
"rhe Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 50, art. 15, defines piracy as "Any illegal
acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship .
"Id. art. 19.
7
BUTLER, supra note 76 at 180.
"BUTLER,

"ld.
"Id.
"Ild.
":Id. at 180-181.
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in its traditional sense of the crime, the acts of the United States are susceptible to a contrary argument that the Glomar was legally justified in salvaging
the Soviet warship.
IV. American Concepts of Salvage
Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States did not attach a reservation to
the Convention which is generally regarded as having codified American salvage
law. 92 Those American practices which were inconsistent with the international
agreement were conformed to the Convention by the Salvage Act of 1912. " The
contemporary embodiment of the 1912 Act is Title 46 of the United States Code,
94
sections 727-731.
The United States' counterpart to Article 14 of the Convention is section 731
of Title 46 which exempts "ships of war or ... government ships appropriated
5
exclusively to a public service" from the provisions of the salvage act. 9 Despite
the rule, it is recognized that Article 14 of the Convention and section 731 do
not prevent the United States from waiving immunity for its public vessels. 96
The United States allows its public vessels to bring suit for salvage services
rendered by them, 97 and imposes liability upon American vessels for salvage
services performed by another ship or person. 9' Nevertheless, the United States
maintains a strict policy which prohibits anyone but the United States government from salvaging sunken American military ships. " This policy has been
enunciated by the United States Navy as follows:
the United States Government does not lose its right, title, or interest of
ownership in a sunken naval vessel, either inside or outside U.S. territorial waters,
unless a formal abandonment of the vessel has been made by the Secretary of the Navy.
Regardless of the passage of time, the U.S. Government's ownership is [sic] wrecked or
sunken naval vessels, and their contents, remains unimpaired until such a formal
abandonment has been made. In the absence thereof, any person attempting salvage of

. ..

922 HAcKwoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (1941).

"rThe Salvage Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 242 (1912), ch. 268:

An act to harmonize the national law of salvage with the provisions of the international conand

vention for the unification of certain rules with respect to assistance and salvage at sea,
for other purposes.
"-46 U.S.C. §§ 727-731 (1970).
'146 U.S.C. § 731 (1970).
"See Nicholas E. Vernicos v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 116 (D.C. N.Y. 1963) at 119:
It cannot seriously be argued that, because the signatories have excluded their own ships from
the purview of this one treaty, they have forever contracted away the right to waive sovereign
immunity by some other method, such as domestic law or other international agreement.
"7See, e.g., The Impoco, 287 F. 400 (S.D. N.Y. 1922); see also 46 U.S.C. § 750 (1970).
"46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970): "Libel in personam"; 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1970): "Libel in admiralty
against or impleader of United States."
"In the Washington Post, March 20, 1975, a column was devoted to the "diplomatic dilemma"
posed by Project Jennifer. A government attorney allegedly stated that the United States has never
acknowledged any such right. § A, at 14, col. 3.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4

694

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

such wrecks or sunken naval vessels, or their contents, does so at his own risk100and
subject to the prior rights of the United States Government. (Emphasis added)
In a number of instances the United States has been asked permission by
foreign governments to salvage sunken United States vessels. 01 Even though the
vessels were within the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting nations, permission was denied in each instance.
The United States strictly regulates all salvage operations within its jurisdiction, particularly those of its own ships. American regulations are strikingly
similar to those of the Soviet Union; salvors are admonished that all phases of
a salvage operation within the jurisdiction of the United States must be cleared
with proper authorities. 10 2 An unauthorized operation by a foreign vessel is
punished by forfeiture of the salvaged ship. 103 A ship which transports salvaged

"U0Letter to author from T.E. Lohrey, Jr., supra note 40. It should be noted, however, that this
position is clarified as being "only Navy policy." Mr. Lohrey states that "We are unable to state the
policy of any other governmental agency."
'The Australian government has repeatedly been denied permission to salvage a submarine of
the United States that was sunk in Sydney Harbor during World War II. L.A. Times, March 20,
1975, § 1, at 14, col. 1.
Japan applied to the United States Department of State for permission to salvage the U.S.S.
Panay, a gunboat sunk in the Yangtze River by Japanese naval airplanes in 1938. It was advised by
Secretary of State Hull that the request was carefully examined by the United States, but it found
"no authority in law for acceding in any case to such a request." Telegram from the Acting
Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan, (1938), 4 FoamN REL. U.S. 213-14 (1938).
In 1965, Trinidad was denied salvage rights to a wrecked merchant vessel of the United States
which sunk near the Port-of-Spain with a cargo of Lend-Lease goods. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
replied that:
Where ownership to vessels or cargoes resided in the U.S. Government at time of sinking, the
U.S. retains title thereto subject to explicit transfer or abandonment of U.S. interests, therefore, salvage of such cargoes or hunks requires U.S. consent.
An excerpt from an airgram, No. A-27, April 29, 1965, sent to the American Embassy, Port-ofSpain, Trinidad, by Rusk. As reported in 9 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 221
(1968).
The replies by both Hull and Rusk suggest that the United States policy regarding the salvage of
sunken public vessels set forth in the body of this Comment is indicative of government agencies
other than the Navy. See note 106, id.
"'2See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1658 (1%4):
Whoever plunders, steals, or destroys any money, goods, merchandise, or other effects from
or belonging to any vessel in distress, or wrecked ... with the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years or both.
See 46 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1952):
No foreign vessel shall, under penalty of forfeiture, engage in salvaging operations [anywhere
within the territorial waters or inland waters of the United States] except when authorized by
a treaty or in accordance with the provisions of the Act of June 19, 1878....
See 46 U.S.C. § 723 (1970):
Every vessel which shall be engaged or employed in carrying or transporting any property whatsoever, taken from any wreck, from the sea, or from any of the keys or shoals, within the jurisdiction of the United States, or the coast of Florida, to any foreign port, shall together with
her tackle, apparel, and furniture, be forfeited, and all forfeitures incurred by virtue of this
section shall accrue one moiety to the informer and the other to the United States.
'0346 U.S.C. § 316 (d) (1952).
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property from a wreck within the jurisdiction of the United States is subject to
seizure and forfeiture.104 An individual convicted of fraud, theft or destruction
of property salvaged within the United States' jurisdiction faces a fine, imprisonment or both punishments. 015
It is submitted that in conformity with Soviet and American law, the legality
of Project Jennifer was lessened by the United States' failure to notify the Soviet
Union of its intentions. The clandestine manner in which the operation was
conducted suggests that the United States realized this in advance but refused
to consult the Soviet Union, fearing that Soviet consent would never have been
given to Project Jennifer. 106
Although the actions of the Glomar Explorer were not in compliance with
the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Glomar might have
been privileged to salvage the submarine if it had been abandoned by the
Soviets. This hypothesis is not favored by the Soviet Union since it did not
publicly terminate ownership of the wreckage. 107 However, United States policy
does not predicate a finding of abandonment solely upon the element of intent
to terminate ownership:
The particular facts in each case must be carefully scrutinized in order to determine
whether or not there has been an abandonment. The condition of the vessel at the time
of leaving together with the acts and statements of her master at the time of departure
and thereafter, must be considered.10
In situations of sunken property, the intentions of the master or crew are
obviously difficult to determine where the vessel sank with all hands on board.
Thus, where the issue of abandonment concerns sunken ships, the most significant factor bearing on the issue is the element of time. '0 9 Abandonment of
a sunken ship is effectively determined by a showing that "a considerable length
of time [has passed] without effort on the part of the owners to secure repossession of their property." 110 In a majority of cases, a passage of time exceeding
10446 U.S.C. § 723 (1970).
1-18 U.S.C. § 1658 (1964).
06
In fact, the operation seems to have been carried out all along with'this assumption. This is
exemplified by the briefings the CIA gave the crew members of the Glomar Explorer before the
ship's departure. Apparently, the crew was advised of the chance of interference by the Soviet Union
should the cover be lifted from Project Jennifer. They were instructed by the CIA that personal
danger was involved and their rights under the Geneva Convention were made very clear to them. It
was known that Soviet trawlers were in the area and that chances were great of being boarded by
armed crew members of the trawlers. L.A. Times, April 7, 1975, § 1, at ?, col. 3; Wash. Post,
March 19, 1975, § A, at 14, col. 5.
'For a Soviet vessel to be deemed abandoned, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. must
first give permission. See note 84 supra.
08
' NoRRIs, supra note 47 at 226.
' 0 Rights in and Ownership of wrecked or derelict vessels and their contents not cast upon the
shore, 63 A.L.R. 2d 1369, 1374 (1959).
11Od.
1
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twenty years has been the standard measure of an effective abandonment.111
Using this standard it is clear that the failure of the Soviets to recover the
wreckage within six years was not sufficient evidence of abandonment of the
submarine.
An indication that the United States knew the Soviet ship had not been abandoned can be seen in a parallel situation in which the United States played
quite a different role. In April, 1971, a group of adventurers expressed a desire
to salvage a sunken German submarine, the U-166, which they discovered lying
on the seabed in the Gulf of Mexico. State and federal agencies opposed and
prohibited the private operation, 1 2 even though the submarine was beyond
the twelve-mile territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 3 The United States
was reportedly concerned about the repercussions of dealing with a foreign
nation's property although it was sunk for nearly thirty years.1" 4
One may draw a strong argument from American law and policy that the
Soviet submarine was not abandoned and vulnerable to salvage by the Glomar.
And even if the submarine was legally abandoned it is questionable whether
the United States was entitled to exclusive ownership of the wreckage.
United States case law is often contradictory in its treatment of the rights of
possession in sunken property because it entertains three different theories of
possession of abandoned property. The minority viewpoint, following the
English common law, is that the government in its sovereign capacity is entitled
to all abandoned vessels lying within the sovereign's territory.1 ,S The celebrated
case of Ervin v. Massachusetts'1 6 is one of the few federal decisions in support
"'See, e.g., Rickard v. Pringle, 293 F. Supp. 981 (D.C.E.D. N.Y. 1968), 60 years; Ervin v.
Massachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1956), 34 years; Greevy v. Breedlove, 12 La. Ann. 745
(1857), 23 years; Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861), 28 years.
The opposition to this particular salvage operation is not unusual as:
It has been a traditional policy of the U.S. Navy to not encourage private salvage operators with
respect to sunken naval vessels, particularly when such operations may result in either disturbing the remains of crew members, the compromise of classified material, or be endangered by
unexploded ordinance, nuclear radiation, or other such hazards.
Letter to author from T.E. Lohrey Jr., supra note 43.
...
The Secret of the Sunken Sub, SENIOR SCHOLASTIC, April 26, 1971 at 15; N.Y. Times, April
21, 1971 at 79 col. 1-4. See also NoRIs, THE LAw OF SALVAGE (CUM. SmPP.), 1974 at 136-137. The
Norris text does not make a citation to this incident, but the material is clearly based upon the
proposed salvage of the U-166:
Even the United States Department of State may enter into the picture when a public vessel
of a foreign country is involved. Recently, some adventurers planned on salving a sunken
enemy submarine. Not only were there questions of title viz-a-viz a foreign sovereign government and the presence of high explosives involved, but also the delicate matter of disturbing
the remains of the dead crew.
"'The salvors were interested in the submarine's cargo which was believed to consist of $400,000
worth of elemental mercury, tons of explosives and perhaps some gold. The United States' decision
to prohibit the operation was partly based on its fear that the salvage could result in the leakage of
the poisonous mercury. N.Y. Times, April 21, 1971 at 79, col. 4.
"'Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d. 902 (Fla. 1956).
"'Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d. 902 (Fla. 1956), in which the State of Massachusetts
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of this position. A more widely-held theory is that the salvor of abandoned
property obtains title to the property, particularly where the owner has not
attempted to recover it within a substantial period of time. 1 7 The best view,
however, seems to be that expressed by Martin J. Norris in his treatise, The
Law of Salvage." 8 Norris' theory of property ownership furthers the important
principle of salvage law, that the admiralty courts must determine title to
abandoned property. 1" 9 According to this view, the owner of property lost at
sea is never divested of title and salvors of the chattels merely obtain a possessory lien. 12 0 The rationale of this theory is most persuasive:
The salutary admiralty rules with respect to the possessory rights of salvors are
designed to provide an orderly and well-governed procedure for the protection and
disposition of distressed property found on navigable waters. Were publicly abandoned marine property discovered on the high-seas-international waters-regarded
at law as a "find" it could well be that violent and lawless acts of the eager or desparate
"finders" would be encouraged.1"1
Project Jennifer appears to have been conducted in total disregard of American and Soviet laws and policies. Apparently, no valid argument exists to substantiate a claim by the United States that the Soviet Gulf-class submarine was
a proper subject of salvage and that a successful salvor of the wreckage was
entitled to its ownership. At best, the United States obtained a lien for the
salvage, assuming, arguendo, that the submarine was rightfully salvaged. The
lien may nevertheless have been forfeited by the actions of the United States;
the Soviet wreckage was appropriated and dealt with unconscionably before
any determination was made of its legal owner.' 22
International law could not sanction the apparently unauthorized salvage
and misappropriation of the Soviet wreckage because of the immunity offered
the Glomar Explorer by Article 14 of the Convention. Soviet and American
laws, inapplicable to the international incident, 3 were also powerless to punish

enjoined the company from proceeding with salvage operations of a naval battleship scuttled and
sunk by the Navy in 1922. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the battleship was, indeed,
abandoned, but that it came within the common law rule. The rule expressed by the Court is that
what is abandoned on the seas is acquired for the sovereign if not claimed by the owner.
"'See, e.g., United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132 (No. 16,317) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864); Wiggins
v. 1,100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452 (D.C.E.D. Va. 1960); Thompson
v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516 (1926); Wyman v. Hurlbert, 12 Ohio 81 (1843).
'"NoRRIs, supra note 47 at 246-248.
l1'Id.
THE LAW OF SALVAGE (CUM. SuPP.), (1974) at 138.
Norris, Misconduct of Salvors, 18 BROOKLYN L. REv. 247, 251 (1952). Norris lists a
number of similar instances in which salvage awards have been forfeited or diminished because of
some misconduct of the salvors.
1"3See notes S1 and 52.
12'NoRRis,

2'See
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the United States for the consequences of Project Jennifer. The Project succeeded despite time-honored salvage principles.
V. Summary and Proposals
International law does not regulate the salvage of military vessels sunk
beneath the high seas perhaps on the assumption that the national policies of
the great powers have effectively inhibited such salvage. However, the Glomar
Explorer,by salvaging the Soviet submarine, has set a precedent that threatens
to change this situation. The general traditions of the maritime nations are
ineffective and inadequate constraints, as Project Jennifer demonstrates. The
Glomar Explorer succeeded in salvaging the Soviet property despite the
U.S.S.R.'s avowal that only the Soviet Ministry of Defense is permitted to
undertake the salvage of sunken Soviet property.
Project Jennifer also revealed that retribution to injured parties is not provided for by international law. The reason why the Soviet Union failed to protest
the salvage operation may never be ascertained. The Soviet Union may have
wished to avoid embarrassment" 4 but it is certain that Russia had no legal
means at its disposal with which to meet the United States' challenge.
The technological advances made by the United States in the construction
of the Glomarwill undoubtedly be duplicated soon by other nations. A corollary
to this development would be an increase in deep-sea salvage operations; other
nations, stimulated by the success of Project Jennifer, could be enticed to
initiate comparable operations. A lack of international guidelines for further
salvage enterprises on the high seas could prove disastrous if a foreign nation
sought to salvage the property that another country desired to protect. National
interests on the level of nuclear weaponry and coding demand extreme security.
In the event a powerful nation would find these interests threatened by a project
similar to "Jennifer," armed conflict could be a logical result.
It is imperative that the law of salvage at sea be amended if the world community is to avoid conflict on the high seas and maintain respect for each other's
interests. The exigence for new laws was demonstrated by Project Jennifer. New
rules are required to meet the demands for immunity from salvage of public
vessels; to provide adequate standards to define the elements of abandoned
property; and to settle the misconceptions surrounding rights to such property.
Additionally, remedies must be provided for those harmed by an improper
salvage and sanctions adopted to punish parties guilty of misconduct in salvage
tasks. An international agreement is the most desirable and most rational
solution for implementing propositions of such scope.

2

See p. 3 infra.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4

Salvage of Sunken Military Vessels
The Convention has its deficiencies, as most treaties do, but it is perhaps the
most effective vehicle for changes in the salvage laws. The Convention provides
that:
Any one of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right, three years after this
Convention comes into force, to call for a fresh Conference with a view to possible
amendments, and particularly with a view to extend, if possible, the sphere of its
application. I25

A new Conference among the world's maritime nations could appropriately
deal with the problems raised by the Glomar Explorer. A primary objective of
the Conference should be to reach a consensus on a clear-cut policy regarding
the salvage of military property sunk in international waters. To remedy existing
ambiguities, Article 14, which exempts public vessels from the terms of the
Convention, should be deleted and completely redrafted. An amendment to
Article 14 should provide either that anyone may salvage sunken military vessels
or that only the flag state may salvage its ships.
The Conference should also address the problems of delineating the character
of sunken property. It must decide whether military vessels should be considered immune from salvage at all times or whether anyone should be allowed
to salvage the vessel after the passage of an assessed number of years. If the
latter course is desired the Conference should explicitly state a number of years
required to constitute abandonment. In this regard, the Conference should
further clarify the rights of ownership of abandoned property. It should be
specified either that the property is subject to a lien, title remaining in the
owner, or that the salvor of sunken property is entitled to full ownership of
property he salvages.
These proposals would be strengthened if stringent sanctions and remedies
were adopted to enforce them. At present, the Convention merely reduces or
denies remuneration if the salvor is found guilty of "theft, receiving stolen
goods, or other acts of fraud."' 2 6 However, it should be recognized that the loss
of remuneration would not conceivably restrain a party who intends to appropriate the property rather than seek compensation for his services. The
Conference should therefore amend the Convention to lessen the possibilities
of misconduct. An effective amendment could parallel the provisions of the
United States Code and require flag states to subject guilty parties to criminal
1 7
prosecution and require the forfeiture of vessels engaged in illegal operations.
It is submitted that a Convention embodying these suggestions would prevent
the recurrence of an operation like Project Jennifer and its accompanying
"'he Convention, supra note 56, art. 16.
" Id.art 8.
"'See note 102 supra.
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dangers. These amendments would adequately protect sunken military property
and clarify the misconceptions surrounding ownership of this property. Most
importantly, if the Convention were amended the likelihood of dangerous
conflict on the high seas would be prevented. Unless a Conference is convened
to consider these problems it is doubtful that the ancient maritime principles
of good faith, integrity and equity will effectively deter misconduct during a
salvage on the high seas.
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